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The behaviors of various conﬁdence/credible interval constructions are explored, particularly in the
region of low event numbers where methods diverge most. We highlight a number of challenges, such as
the treatment of nuisance parameters, and common misconceptions associated with such constructions.
An informal survey of the literature suggests that conﬁdence intervals are not always deﬁned in relevant
ways and are too often misinterpreted and/or misapplied. This can lead to seemingly paradoxical
behaviors and ﬂawed comparisons regarding the relevance of experimental results. We therefore
conclude that there is a need for a more pragmatic strategy which recognizes that, while it is critical to
objectively convey the information content of the data, there is also a strong desire to derive bounds on
model parameter values and a natural instinct to interpret things this way. Accordingly, we attempt to
put aside philosophical biases in favor of a practical view to propose a more transparent and self-
consistent approach that better addresses these issues.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The ability to distill experimental results in a form relevant to
theoretical models is fundamental to scientiﬁc inquiry. Yet the best
approach for this is still a matter of considerable discussion and
debate. At the heart of the issue is the desire to both objectively
quantify results in a frequentist manner and also draw relevant
inferences for speciﬁc models, which inherently requires a Bayesian
context (i.e. a choice of prior) for those models. A failure to sat-
isfactorily address both of these aspects has, in many cases, led to
misinterpretation and misapplication that have not been mitigated
by the adoption of new frequentist conventions. The impact is largest
for experiments working in the region of low numbers of signal
events, where different approaches diverge most. The confusion is
not helped by the use of forms for the display of frequentist info-
rmation that seem to suggest direct bounds on model parameter
values or relative experimental sensitivities to such models, neither
of which is necessarily the case. Suggestions that such confusion
arises from questions that should not be asked concerning models
are not satisfactory and fail to confront the fact that scientists do, in
fact, ask such questions and should therefore make use of the
appropriate formalism for these.
In fact, the goals of both objectively conveying the relevant
information content of data and deriving bounds on model para-
meter values are not mutually exclusive, but rather are closely
linked. It is not generally possible to translate experimental results
into meaningful model constraints without specifying a prior. As
such, detailed objective information should be used to clearly
deﬁne the context for Bayesian constraints. The issue is therefore
largely one of establishing relevance and transparency.
In this paper, we brieﬂy review the nature of various interval
constructions; highlight some apparent paradoxes that arise from
common misinterpretations; cite speciﬁc cases where experiments
have run into such issues; discuss several aspects associated with
practical implementation; and, ﬁnally, propose an approach to dir-
ectly address the above issues in a more relevant, self-consistent and
transparent manner using standard techniques.
2. Interval constructions and their meaning
2.1. Bayesian
Bayesian probabilities quantify the degree of belief in a hypoth-
esis. Given a measurement, the goal of a Bayesian approach is to
assign probabilities to the range of possible model parameter values.
By necessity, this requires an assumed context for these models
(prior), as indicated by Bayes' Theorem:
PðHijDÞ ¼
PðDjHiÞPðHiÞ
∑j PðDjHjÞPðHjÞ
ð1Þ
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where PðHijDÞ is the posterior probability of hypothesis Hi given the
data D; PðDjHiÞ is the likelihood of the data assuming hypothesis Hi;
and PðHiÞ is the prior probability for Hi that deﬁnes the a priori
context relative to other model parameter values. The ratio between
Bayesian probabilities therefore provides an estimate of relative
“betting odds” for which hypotheses are most likely to be correct.
For a purely Bayesian approach, there is no relevance of the
concept of “statistical coverage” of a credible interval (the frequency
with which a large number of repetitions of an experiment subject to
random ﬂuctuations would yield intervals that bound the correct
hypothesis), since no comparison is done to a hypothetical ensemble
— only the actual measurements matter. If desired, the effective
statistical coverage can often still be estimated for Bayesian con-
structions using Monte Carlo calculations, etc. (as shown in Appendix
A), but the credibility level that deﬁnes the construction simply
relates the actual observation directly to the model.
Bayesian credible intervals are simply deﬁned by the relevant
portion of the posterior probability density function (PDF) that
constitutes a fraction equal to a pre-deﬁned credibility for the
interval, CI. The way this fraction is selected may be altered to
yield lower bounds, upper bounds, central intervals, the most
compact interval, or intervals containing the highest probability
densities. For intervals, as opposed to bounds, we suggest that
using the highest probability density offers the most intuitive and
robust deﬁnition for an arbitrary probability distribution.
As a simple example, we give the construction for an upper bound
(i.e. the critical value up to which integration is performed) on an
average signal strength, S, in a Poisson counting experiment where
the expected background level is B and a total of n events is observed:
R Sup
0 ½ðSþBÞneðSþBÞ=n!PðSÞ dSR1
0 ½ðSþBÞneðSþBÞ=n!PðSÞ dS
¼ CI ð2Þ
where Sup is the upper bound to be determined, P(S) is the prior
probability for S, and CI is the desired credibility for the interval. In the
case where all positive values of S are a priori given equal considera-
tion (i.e. a uniform prior in which P(S) is a constant for SZ0), this can
be shown, by repeated integrations by parts, to be equivalent to
∑nm ¼ 0ðSupþBÞmeðSupþBÞ=m!
∑nm ¼ 0B
meB=m!
¼ 1CI: ð3Þ
Thus, Sup can be interpreted as denoting the upper limit on the
range of model parameter values for which the probability of
observing n events or less is not more than 1CI, given that the
possible number of background events cannot be greater than the
total number of events observed in this measurement. If a non-
uniform prior were used instead, the form would be modiﬁed and
the interpretation would be that the upper limit is on the corre-
spondingly weighted range of model parameter values.
2.2. Standard frequentist
Frequentist probabilities are deﬁned as the relative frequencies of
occurrence given a hypothetical ensemble of similar experiments
subject to random ﬂuctuations. There is no such thing as a “prob-
ability” for a model parameter to lie within derived bounds — either
it does or it does not. However, if everyone derived bounds in the
same way, the correct model would be correctly bounded a known
fraction of the time (for more on statistical coverage, see Appendix A).
Rather than using the posterior probability, the Neyman con-
struction of frequentist intervals [1] starts with the probability
density function (PDF) for a given observation under a ﬁxed hypoth-
esis that is used to construct the likelihood. For each possible
hypothesis, a portion of the possible outcomes containing the
fraction CL (frequentist conﬁdence level) is deﬁned. The range of
model parameter values for which a given measurement is “likely”
(i.e. would be contained within that CL fraction) then deﬁnes the
conﬁdence region. Note that this is not the same as a statement that
any given model is likely (which is Bayesian) and, indeed, the
construction is such as to avoid any direct comparison of models.
However, as before, there is an ambiguity in this construction
regarding how the PDF is used to compose the initial frequency
intervals, with common ordering choices including central, highest
probability density and most compact intervals. We will deﬁne
frequentist approaches that use an ordering principle based on the
expected frequency of observations for a given hypothesis as
“standard frequentist.” Approaches that fall outside of this include
those that use a likelihood ratio test as an alternative ordering
principle, such as Feldman–Cousins [2] (which will be discussed
separately in the next section).
For comparison, the standard frequentist construction for an
upper bound on an average signal strength, S, in a Poisson
counting experiment where the expected background level is B
and a total of n events is observed can be written as follows:
∑
n
m ¼ 0
ðSupþBÞmeðSupþBÞ=m!¼ 1CL ð4Þ
where Sup can thus be interpreted as denoting the upper limit on
the range of model parameter values for which n events or less
would be observed with a relative frequency of not more than
1CL if the measurements were to be repeated a large number of
times. Note that this differs from the Bayesian formula for a
uniform prior only in the absence of the background normal-
ization. In other words, for this construction, the possible number
of background events is not constrained to be less than or equal to
the total number of all events observed in this particular measure-
ment. This is because the probability being calculated is that for
observing n events during a generic trial for an ensemble of
measurements, and does not take into account additional informa-
tion available from any particular observation (such as the fact that
the number of background events actually detected cannot exceed
n). Thus, the probability associated with any particular measure-
ment is not a meaningful concept in the frequentist approach.
This can also be seen by the fact that the lack of a background
normalization means that there will be cases for which Eq. (4) does
not yield a positive solution for Sup. These are instances where the
observed number of events is already deemed to be less probable
than the desired conﬁdence level. Such “empty intervals” are
perfectly allowed and, indeed, are necessary in order to guarantee
the correct statistical coverage for the frequency of observations
within the overall ensemble of hypothetical experiments. Individual
frequentist bounds, however, do not have meaning for model
parameter values by themselves. Indeed, for a case where the
conﬁdence interval is empty, the observer knows that for this
particular data set the conﬁdence interval does not contain the true
value of the parameter, even if the repeated construction of such
conﬁdence intervals would correctly bound it in, say, 90% of the
cases where statistical ﬂuctuations resulted in different data sets.
This distinction is fundamental: frequentist conﬁdence intervals are
always statements about how often a large ensemble of hypothe-
tical experiments will bound the true value, and are never a
statement that there is a particular probability that the true value
is contained in the interval for any individual data set. In fact, in
many cases for both standard frequentist and Feldman-Cousins
intervals, the experimenters may know that it is very unlikely that
the true model is contained in the generated interval for their
particular data set. This situation often tends to conﬂict with the
desired interpretations of these bounds, since the question of
interest to most experimenters is the relevance of their own
particular data set for the model parameter values under study,
rather than the behavior of a large ensemble of hypothetical
experiments that were not actually performed.
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2.3. Feldman–Cousins
The approach of Feldman and Cousins [2] uses an ordering
principle for the Neyman construction based on the ratio of like-
lihoods which, for the measurement of a quantity typiﬁed by a
mean expectation, μ, is given by
ΛμðxÞ ¼ LðxjμÞLðxjμbestÞ
ð5Þ
where x is the measurement and μbest is the mean for the
hypothesis in the physical region for which the data is most likely
(not necessarily the most likely hypothesis, an assessment of
which would call for a Bayesian construction).
In the standard frequentist case, the composition of intervals is
simply based on the expected relative frequency of observations
under each hypothesis. However, under the Feldman–Cousins
approach, the composition of intervals is instead determined by
a likelihood comparison across potentially different hypotheses,
which can therefore lead to less intuitive interval choices.
As an example of how these interval deﬁnitions can differ,
consider the case of a Gaussian variable with unit variance and a
mean of μ¼ 0:5. Assume that this value of μ is unknown to us, but
represents a physical quantity (such as a mass) that must be non-
negative. From a given observation, we then wish to deﬁne 90% CL
bounds for μ. Fig. 1 shows the relative frequency of observations, P
(x). The red striped area indicates the range of observations for
which the correct value of μ is bounded by a central standard
frequentist interval. These bounds are symmetric, extending
71:65σ relative to the value of x¼0.5, as might be expected.
However, as indicated by the black striped area, the range of
observations for which the correct value of μ is bounded by a
Feldman–Cousins frequentist interval is notably asymmetric (due
to the fact that μbestZ0). The actual mean is included in the 90% CL
interval for an observation of x¼ 1:6, even though the observa-
tion is more than 2σ away from the true value. On the other hand,
the interval excludes the true mean for an observation of x¼1.9,
even though this is less than 1.5σ away from the true mean and,
hence, nearly 3 times more likely to occur.
This counterintuitive result illustrates that the interpretation of
the Feldman–Cousins ordering principle, which is not based
directly on the frequency of the observation but instead on the
likelihood ratio ΛðxjμÞ, is not straightforward.
Feldman and Cousins cite Section 23.1 of the 5th edition of
Kendall's book [3] as implying the ordering principle for their
interval construction, but, in fact, Sections 31.31–31.34 of that
same reference are much more explicit regarding the general use
of a likelihood ratio to deﬁne conﬁdence intervals. These sections
end with the statement, “The difﬁculties with such an approach are,
as before, the lack of a frequency interpretation for Pn or, indeed, any
direct interpretation for the function. Here, as elsewhere, the statis-
tician must decide whether he or she is willing to make the logical
leap in order to justify inferential statements that relate to single
experiments.”
One stated purpose of the Feldman–Cousins construction is to
avoid empty intervals, thus making the bounds appear more
physical for the model. However, as previously indicated, such
empty intervals do not actually pose any problems in principle
since frequentist bounds do not refer to direct restrictions on the
physical model and only take on meaning for a large ensemble of
measurements, where statistical coverage is indeed upheld. While
the ordering principle used in the Feldman–Cousins approach
ensures that intervals are never empty, which many may ﬁnd less
disconcerting, this does not avoid the basic issue that the bound
for any particular data set may not be meaningful, and situations
in which conventional frequentist intervals are empty are often
situations in which the Feldman–Cousins procedure returns a
value that is prone to misinterpretation as being an unduly strict
bound on a model.
Feldman and Cousins themselves recognized this problem,
noting that this results from a confusion with Bayesian inferences,
which are more relevant for decision making. Accordingly, they
recommended accompanying each limit by the average expected
limit (the “sensitivity” of the measurement) “in order to provide
information that will assist in this (Bayesian) assessment.” Cases in
which the obtained limit is signiﬁcantly better than the expected
sensitivity are cases where there is a higher probability that the true
parameter value is not contained within the derived bounds.
However, the expected limit clearly does not represent an actual
measurement, and how information from this and/or the derived
bounds is to be quantitatively applied in order to arrive at a
Bayesian (or any other) assessment for these cases is not at all
clear. Furthermore, this issue does not, in fact, have a clear thresh-
old, as all negative ﬂuctuations yield tighter bounds than the
expected limit. Even worse, merely producing non-empty intervals
by itself is not obviously an improvement in relevance or clarity,
since any particular interval (empty or not) constructed for a given
data set will not generally contain the true parameter value with a
probability indicated by the quoted conﬁdence interval, in spite of a
nearly universal tendency to misinterpreted it as such. The mere
fact that Feldman–Cousins returns non-empty intervals in some
cases may actually obfuscate their nature. In many ways a null
interval, while disconcerting, at least is transparently not a limit on
the parameter, whereas a narrow but non-empty Feldman–Cousins
interval, such as often occurs when the data ﬂuctuates below the
expected background, may give the false impression that the
conﬁdence interval is meaningful for bounding a model.
3. Examples of the behavior of upper bounds for low numbers
of events
We will now explore a number of scenarios in the region of low
event numbers that highlight the differences between various
interval constructions.
As an initial example, consider the scenario where the expected
number of background events, B, for 1 year of running with a 1 kg
detector is 9, but a statistical ﬂuctuation results in a total of only
5 events observed. A ﬂuctuation this low or lower would happen
Fig. 1. Upper plot: relative frequency for observations, x, of a Gaussian variable
with σ ¼ 1 and μ¼ 0:5. The range of observations for which the true mean is
bounded for standard frequentist (red stripes) and Feldman–Cousins intervals
(black stripes) at 90% CL are shown. Lower plot: values of the corresponding
ordering parameter used to deﬁne the composition of the Feldman–Cousins
interval. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure caption, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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nearly 12% of the time if the true signal rate were zero. We now
wish to construct a 90% CL (frequentist) or CI (Bayesian) upper
bound, Sup, on a signal of strength S.
3.1. Standard frequentist
For the Standard Frequentist case, the above scenario yields
from Eq. (4) a value of Sup¼0.27 events per kg per year.
Now consider the further scenario in which we were contem-
plating running the experiment for an additional year. The second
year of data would very likely yield a number of background
events much closer to the expected mean, so we would likely end
up with a total of approximately 5þ9¼14 events where 18 are
expected over the 2 year run. The same formalism would then
result in a value of Sup¼2.12 events per 2 kg-years, or a bound on
the rate of 1.06 events per kg per year, which is nearly 4 times less
restrictive than the limit from the ﬁrst year of data.
Furthermore, consider the case for a new experiment to be
constructed with 100 times the ﬁducial mass. What constraints is
it likely to achieve? Here we can use σ 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p
and the 1-sided
Gaussian approximation that 90% CL corresponds to  1:28σ. This
means that after 1 year of running we would typically expect a
bound of 1:28
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
900
p
=100 kg¼ 0:38 events per kg per year, which is
still not as restrictive as the ﬁrst run with a substantially inferior
experiment.
Therefore, using the value of the derived frequentist bounds
alone to assess the relevance of a given experimental observation
leads to a counter-intuitive behavior that does not appear to place
the measurement in the desired context. This demonstrates that
individual frequentist bounds do not actually relate to restrictions
on the model and do not even necessarily represent a measure of
how sensitive or informative one experimental measurement is
relative to another one. Frequentist bounds only take on meaning
in these regards in the actual presence of a large ensemble
measurements, but not individually. Compare this with the Baye-
sian case below.
3.2. Bayesian
Here we will assume that all non-negative rates have an a priori
equal probability density and, accordingly, choose a uniform prior
in S for SZ0. While numerical values for the derived bounds may
be modiﬁed under a different assumption, their qualitative beha-
vior will remain the same. For the case at hand (9 events expected,
5 observed), the uniform prior assumption yields a value of
Sup¼3.88 events per kg per year, which is  14 times larger than
the standard frequentist bound.
Now consider again what would happen if we decided to run
the experiment for another year, once more assuming that we
would likely end up with 14 events with 18 expected over 2 years.
The above formalism would then result in a bound of 5.89 for the
2-year run, or a 90% CI rate limit of 2.945 per kg per year, which is
noticeably better than before.
For the case of a 1-year exposure of an experiment with 100
times the ﬁducial mass, the limit would approach 0.38 events per
kg per year (as before), which is very signiﬁcantly better.
Thus, Bayesian bounds on the actual model behave as would be
expected for something that reﬂects the success and relevance of a
given experimental measurement, indicating that it is generally
beneﬁcial to run for longer and build better experiments under
such scenarios.
A Bayesian calculation will result in a more stringent upper
bound for downward ﬂuctuations because these bounds make
explicit use of the constraint that the number of background
events actually detected cannot be larger than the total number of
observed events (i.e. the denominator of Eq. (3)). The most
stringent bounds therefore always occur when n¼0, since the
number of backgrounds is then also known to be identically zero
for this observation. Hence, Bayesian intervals are independent of
the expected background rate for such cases. However, this is not
so for the frequentist case, which has no such normalization and
where much larger variations for individual measurements are
allowed because less likely measurements carry inherently less
weight in the ensemble of other possible outcomes that deﬁnes
the coverage. A frequentist limit based on an observed non-zero n
can, counterintuitively, even be more stringent than a limit for
n¼0, depending on the expected background levels for each case.
3.3. Feldman–Cousins
The Feldman–Cousins (F–C) bound on the scenario of
9 expected background events and 5 observed events yields a
90% CL value of Sup¼2.38. This is 9 times larger than the sta-
ndard frequentist bound but a factor of 1.6 smaller than the
Bayesian uniform prior value, so clearly has a different interpreta-
tion than either of these other approaches. It neither refers to
bounds on the physical model, as in Bayesian limits, nor are the
sets of observables selected to deﬁne the statistical coverage nec-
essarily in direct proportion to the frequency of possible measure-
ments, as in standard frequentist intervals.
This can be seen even more clearly by considering a more
extreme example in which 5 background events are expected but
no events are observed during the run. In the Bayesian approach,
the background is known to be identically zero for this one and
only measurement, leading to a 90% CI upper bound on an average
signal of 2.3 (uniform prior case). For the standard frequentist
approach, concerned with the frequency of the observed number
of counts in a large ensemble of experiments, an empty interval is
returned for a 90% CL since this observation has a probability of
much less than 10% even under the zero signal hypothesis, so no
positive signal strength can accommodate the criteria. However,
for F–C, the following Table 1 shows the upper limits obtained for
different conﬁdence intervals.
It may look odd to have intervals for Swith up to nearly 3 signal
events allowed for these conﬁdence levels when, for an expected
background of 5 events, the frequency with which no counts
would be observed even if S were identically zero is only 0.67%.
However, this is a reﬂection of how the acceptance region in the
observable has been distributed in a way that is not proportional
to the frequency of possible observations and that the statistical
coverage only takes on meaning for the ensemble.
As mentioned previously, Feldman and Cousins did recognize
the problematic nature of limits such as those in Table 1 and
recommended stating both the limit and the expected sensitivity,
which in this case is 5.18 at 90% C.L. for S¼0, more than 5 times
larger than what appears in the table. This large difference bet-
ween the expected sensitivity and the limit is a warning ﬂag that
the limit should be interpreted with extreme caution. Had one
event been observed, the Feldman–Cousins 90% limit would be
1.22, and for nobs ¼ 2 it would be 1.73, all of which are noticeably
lower than the expected sensitivity. However, the probability of
nobsr2 is by no means negligible (12.5%). The fact that the
Feldman–Cousins procedure results in limits that appear restric-
tive but are actually less likely to contain the true value of the
Table 1
Feldman–Cousins upper bounds on S when 5 counts are expected but none are
observed (an occurrence with a statistical frequency of less than 1% for S¼0).
Conﬁdence level (%) 68.27 90 95 99
Upper bound on S 0.19 0.98 1.54 2.94
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parameter in such a signiﬁcant fraction of cases is ultimately uns-
atisfactory.
Various attempts have been made to modify the Feldman–
Cousins procedure to improve its performance for downwards
ﬂuctuations in background. Roe and Woodroofe presented an
approach in which the likelihood is replaced by a “conditioned”
likelihood, where the conﬁdence intervals are constructed using
conditional probabilities given the constraint that the number of
background events cannot exceed the total number of observed
events [4]. While this generates satisfactory results in the speciﬁc
case of Poisson processes, Cousins has shown that this procedure
does not generalize well, and gives unsatisfactory results for a
continuous Gaussian variable near a physical boundary [5]. In
response, Roe and Woodroofe have proposed using Bayesian
credible intervals in a similar way to what we will discuss in this
paper, and have explored some of their coverage properties [6].
3.4. Example of behavior under an improved analysis
As one more example to compare the behavior of upper limits
for the different approaches, ﬁrst consider the case where 5 back-
grounds are expected and 2 events are observed. The resulting 90%
CL/CI upper bounds are given in the ﬁrst column of Table 2. Now
assume that an improved analysis technique is developed that is
expected to reduce the background levels by a factor of 10 while
not impacting the efﬁciency of signal detection. When this is
applied to the same data set, the events previously observed are
cut. The new 90% CL/CI upper bounds are then re-computed and
given in the second column of Table 2.
For both standard and F–C frequentist approaches, paradoxi-
cally, the improved analysis actually results in a worse constraint
on S. Only the Bayesian limit improves, behaving more as would be
intuitively expected under this scenario. This example goes to
further illustrate the point already made: that individual frequen-
tist bounds neither relate to restrictions on the model, nor do they
necessarily represent a measure of how sensitive or informative
one experimental measurement is relative to another one.
Pragmatically, we believe that any useful method for producing
limits must do so for any data observation, with a meaning that
is easy to interpret and provides a reasonable, robust and intu-
itive basis on which to compare results. Both the standard and
Feldman-Cousins methods appear to fail in this regard a non-
negligible fraction of the time, and the suggestion that this pro-
blem can be dealt with by simply quoting the expected sensitivity
and leaving the interpretation to the individual's judgement does
not seem like a viable way to proceed.
4. Example of issues with intervals in the presence of a clear
signal
Up to now, examples have focused on potential issues of misin-
terpretation related to upper bounds. We give here an example
where a 2-sided interval construction for a clear signal can also
lead to complications for a frequentist approach.
Consider the case of an ultra-high energy neutrino detector, such
as IceCube [7], looking for signs of extra-terrestrial neutrinos from
astrophysical sources. Assume that the instrument has a known
Gaussian energy resolution and that one event with an apparent
energy well beyond expectations for atmospheric neutrinos is
observed. Say we now wish to construct a conﬁdence interval for
the energy of the neutrino itself (as opposed to the deposited
energy). However, the likely energy of the event is strongly depe-
ndent on the index of the underlying energy spectrum, which is
unknown. For example, the observation is much more likely to have
resulted from the ﬂuctuation of a lower energy event if the under-
lying differential neutrino spectrum was proportional to E3 as
opposed to E2 or E1. Without knowing this index, it is therefore
not possible to uniquely deﬁne a hypothetical ensemble of repeated
measurements, and frequentist bounds on the deposited energy
alone can be misleading if incorrectly interpreted in terms of the
neutrino energy. One could treat the index as a nuisance parameter
but, as shown later, the associated uncertainties still cannot be
propagated in a self-consistent manner using a purely frequentist
framework. However, Bayesian bounds are well-deﬁned, where the
dependence on the assumed spectral prior is made explicit and the
sensitivity to this choice can be shown.
While this example was chosen as a particularly clear case, all
intervals are subject to this issue at some level. If the choice of
prior is obvious or does not matter, Bayesian bounds are unambig-
uous. If the choice of prior is not clear and leads to differences in
interpretation, a Bayesian construction is explicit regarding this
context, whereas the misinterpretation of a frequentist interval as
bounds on a model can lead to erroneous conclusions that are effe-
ctively based on an assumed but hidden prior.
5. Comparison of experimental limits
It has already been noted that frequentist intervals do not
necessarily reﬂect the relevance of individual experimental mea-
surements. However, this issue is worth further discussion since
the comparison of derived frequentist intervals from different
experiments are often made on exclusion plots etc., which can
lead to erroneous conclusions.
To illustrate this, consider the scenario of two counting experi-
ments making observations to place bounds on an possible signal.
The ﬁrst of these has an expected background of just 1 count,
while the second suffers from a higher average background level.
Now consider the ensemble of comparisons between 90% CL/CI
upper interval bounds for Experiment #1 and Experiment #2
under the zero signal hypothesis. Fig. 2 plots the fraction of times
the derived upper bound for the interval of Experiment #2 is
found to be smaller than that of Experiment #1 as a function of the
average background level for Experiment #2. Some unevenness
due to Poisson quantization can be seen, especially for lower back-
ground numbers. However, in all cases, this fraction is substan-
tially greater for Feldman–Cousins (crosses) as compared with
Bayesian (circles) intervals, with the difference as large as a factor
of 3 at higher background levels. In other words, bounds derived
from Feldman–Cousins are less likely to reﬂect the relative sens-
itivities of experiments.
Another indicator of the robustness of derived bounds under
the hypothesis of zero signal is the size of the RMS deviation
associated with the difference between two such bounds, obtained
for pairs of experiments with identical expected background
levels. This is shown in Fig. 3 for the 90% CL/CI upper bound in
intervals for uniform-prior Bayesian (circles) and Feldman–Cou-
sins (crosses) constructions as a function of the average back-
ground level for both experiments. In all cases, the Feldman–
Cousins bounds correspond to RMS values that are over 30% larger
Table 2
90% CL/CI upper bounds on S when 5 background counts are expected and 2 events
are observed, compared with those for an analysis with 10 times better background
rejection.
B ¼ 5, n ¼ 2 Improved cuts: B ¼ 0.5, n ¼ 0
Standard frequentist 0.32 1.8
Feldman–Cousins 1.73 1.94
Bayesian 3.13 2.3
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than for the Bayesian case, indicating that these are noticeably less
robust, being more likely to yield apparent discrepancies between
different experiments and to change under repeated observations.
These issues are more than of esoteric interest, and several
examples can be found where the representation of experimental
results appear to run into difﬁculties when couched in a frequen-
tist context.
5.1. KARMEN II
The KARMEN II neutrino oscillation experiment observed zero
events during its initial run between February 1997 and April
1998, where the expected background was 2.8870.13 [8]. Derived
Feldman–Cousins bounds consequently yielded an upper limit of
1.07 events at the 90% CL, more than a factor of two more
restrictive than uniform-prior Bayesian bounds would have pro-
duced. This led to numerous incorrect statements in the literature
concerning constraints on model parameters and the widespread
promulgation of exclusion plots comparing frequentist bounds
that erroneously suggested signiﬁcantly better constraints relative
to other experiments than were justiﬁed. Further data gathered up
to March 2000 quadrupled the statistics and, after ﬂuctuations
took their due course, 11 events were observed in the full data set
compared to 12.370.6 expected [9]. This produced nearly iden-
tical constraints to the previous set, which had only 1/4 the
exposure. Had uniform-prior Bayesian bounds been used instead,
the experimenters would have found that their constraints were
initially less restrictive, but then improved by a factor of 2 when
the statistics were quadrupled, in line with expectation.
5.2. LEP and LHC (The CLsþb method)
Members of the ALEPH, DELPHI, L3 and OPAL collaborations
recognized the potential difﬁculties in interpreting frequentist
limits in the face of ﬂuctuations. In their joint 2003 paper ‘Search
for the standard model Higgs boson at LEP,’ [10], the authors note
the following regarding frequentist intervals: “…this procedure
may lead to the undesired possibility that a large downward
ﬂuctuation of the background would allow hypotheses to be excluded
for which the experiment has no sensitivity due to the small expected
signal rate.” Their solution was to re-deﬁne their “frequentist”
upper bounds based on the ratio of the chance probability for the
observation under a given signalþbackground hypothesis to that
under the hypothesis of background alone [11]. In the context of a
simple counting experiment, this “CLsþb method” would therefore
take the form of Eq. (3) which, in fact, is a Bayesian bound with
uniform prior. The equivalence with a Bayesian bound also holds
for a Gaussian with a prior uniform in the mean and can some-
times be found for other distributions with different choices of
prior. However, this equivalence is not true in general and, in
particular, does not hold for the likelihood ratio test statistic often
used to search for new particles.
While the CLsþb statistic avoids bounds that may appear overly
strict for negative ﬂuctuations, the interpretation of the associated
conﬁdence levels is unclear and, in fact, is variable, depending on
the test statistic. It does not guarantee frequentist coverage, nor
does it necessarily provide well-deﬁned bounds on model para-
meter values themselves (and even in cases where there is a
Bayesian equivalent, the form of the prior is not explicitly evident).
Nevertheless, the technique is now ubiquitous amongst LHC
experiments as well, being used (as with LEP) essentially as a
binary assessment as to whether an observation is signiﬁcant. If so,
a 2-sided Feldman–Cousins interval is then typically quoted,
though this scheme now violates the principles on which the
Feldman–Cousins method is predicated (i.e. that the nature of the
interval is automatically determined by the construction). For such
a binary assessment, it is unclear what advantage this provides
over a simple p-value (test of consistency with the zero signal
hypothesis). Beyond this, if one wished to constrain model para-
meter values themselves with well-deﬁned conﬁdence levels,
appropriate Bayesian bounds could instead be derived.
It is worth emphasizing again that the issue of negative
ﬂuctuations is entirely a consequence of misinterpreting frequen-
tist bounds or, equivalently, using the wrong construction to
answer a Bayesian question. We ﬁnd it curious that, in order to
apparently avoid a philosophical issue about providing an unam-
biguous interpretation, the authors have instead opted to use a
scheme without any consistent interpretation at all. A more
straightforward approach would be to confront the speciﬁc nature
of the questions being posed and then adopt an appropriate, well-
deﬁned and consistent mathematical formalism.
5.3. ZEPLIN III
In 2009, the ZEPLIN III collaboration published their ﬁrst
bounds on dark matter [12]. The limits were largely based on a
large region within the signal box where no events were observed.
Fig. 2. The fraction of times that the derived 90% CL/CI upper interval bounds for
Experiment #2 (higher background) are found to be more restrictive than those of
Experiment #1 (background of 1 event) as a function of the average background
level for Experiment #2. Cases for uniform-prior Bayesian (circles) and Feldman–
Cousins (crosses) constructions are shown. Some unevenness due to Poisson
quantization is visible.
Fig. 3. The RMS deviation between 90% CL/CI upper interval bounds from two
experiments with the same expected background level. Cases for uniform-prior
Bayesian (circles) and Feldman–Cousins (crosses) constructions are shown for the
zero signal hypothesis as a function of expected background level. Notably larger
ﬂuctuations in the derived bounds are seen for the Feldman–Cousins case.
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The authors noted that the ﬁt expectation for the average back-
ground level was greater than this and, together with the difﬁculty
in quantifying some systematics associated with the background
extrapolation, this “compromised” the use of frequentist techni-
ques, such as maximum likelihood or Feldman–Cousins. Conse-
quently, they instead used the maximum value allowed for a
Feldman–Cousins 90% CL interval of 2.44 (the value at n¼ B¼ 0).
Clearly, while this may be seen as a “conservative estimate” of a
frequentist bound that must be greater than 90%, the meaning of
the conﬁdence level beyond this is simply not deﬁned. Had the
authors instead used a Bayesian approach with a uniform prior,
they would have arrived at a bound of 2.3 at 90% CI — a value that
is, in fact, well-deﬁned for this case.
5.4. EXO-200
The EXO collaboration published ﬁrst results from the EXO-200
neutrinoless double beta-decay experiment in 2012 [13]. In the
71σ energy resolution window around the endpoint, 1 event was
observed where a background of 4.170.3 counts was expected.
Using a spectrum ﬁt, the authors derived a bound of o 2.8 total
signal counts at the 90% CL, corresponding to a lower bound to the
half-life for 0νββ of 1:6 1025 years. A Feldman–Cousins bound
based on the 71σ bin would have yielded a limit of less than
2.0 signal counts at 90% CL (accounting for the 68% signal
efﬁciency of the bin), corresponding to an even more restrictive
90% CL lower bound for the half-life due to the negative ﬂuctua-
tion of 2:2 1025 years. On the other hand, a Bayesian bound with
a prior uniform in counting rate based on the 71σ bin would have
yielded a limit of less than 4.0 signal counts, corresponding to a
90% CI lower bound to the half-life of only 1:1 1025 years—
seemingly less restrictive than the Feldman–Cousins bound by a
factor of two.
The EXO data falls exactly into the category of paradoxical
situations for frequentist intervals previously described, where
improved background rejection and/or longer periods of data
collection would likely result in less restrictive bounds than for
the initial case. And, in fact, an update of EXO-200 results
published in 2014 using 2 years of data with quadruple the
exposure of the initial result appeared to actually suggest a
positive  1:2σ ﬂuctuation in the larger data set that accentuates
this effect [14]. Within the 71σ energy resolution window around
the endpoint, 21 events were observed where a background of
1672 counts was expected [15]. All approaches derive similar
bounds for this case: the authors derived a 1-sided 90% CL lower
bound to the 0νββ half-life of t1=241:1 1025 years by applying
Wilks' Theorem to a likelihood analysis, which is a factor of 1.45
less restrictive than the initial result. A Feldman–Cousins analysis
based on the 71σ bin would yield a bound of t1=241:3 1025
years, a factor of 1.7 less restrictive than the F–C bound from
the initial result. A Bayesian bound, with a prior uniform in
counting rate and based on the same bin yields a value of
t1=241:4 1025 years or, using the appropriate integration of
the posterior probability derived from the provided likelihood
curve assuming a uniform prior, a value of t1=241:2 1025 years.
Both Bayesian calculations are modestly more restrictive than the
initial Bayesian result, thus better reﬂecting the relevance of the
measurements and providing a substantially more stable basis for
comparison in the face of these background ﬂuctuations. These
results are summarised in Table 3.
These are just a few obvious examples of cases sampled across
a number of different areas in particle physics. However, the fact is
that all such comparisons of experimental results using frequentist
bounds are sensitive to these issues at some level.
6. Issues associated with the treatment of nuisance
parameters
The concept of frequentist coverage presents particular chal-
lenges when trying to incorporate the effects of other unknown
parameters. A conﬁdence interval construction is said to have, say,
90% coverage if, for any true value of a parameter θ that is to be
estimated, an ensemble of repeated experiments would result in
constructions that would contain this value in 90% of the repetitions.
Consider now the case that the likelihood Lðxjθ; ξÞ depends on a
second parameter ξ. Here ξ may either be a parameter of physics
interest, or a nuisance parameter representing the effects of a
systematic uncertainty. A common experimental problem is to dete-
rmine a 1D conﬁdence interval for θ, independent of the value of ξ.
Standard frequentist techniques can readily deﬁne a 2D con-
ﬁdence region in the θ, ξ plane so that, for any point (θ, ξ), the
generated region will contain that point in 90% of random trials.
But these techniques do not provide any satisfactory way of pro-
ducing a 1D conﬁdence interval for θ, independent of ξ, with a
desired level of coverage.
Two possible deﬁnitions of coverage may be considered in this
case. The “strong” deﬁnition of coverage would be that the 1D
interval generated by the method should contain the true value of
θ in 90% of cases, for any values of θ and ξ. This would be the
desired deﬁnition of coverage for a purely frequentist construc-
tion, since ξ may represent a parameter whose value is constant
but unknown, and not subject to ﬂuctuations from trial to trial.
One may also consider a “weak” coverage requirement. In this
approach, ξ is thought of as a random variable that may have a
different value every time the experiment is done (although this is
not always the case in actuality). If the frequency distribution for ξ
is known and denoted by f ðξÞ, then we could less stringently
require that the frequency for the 1D interval generated by a
random measurement x to contain the true value of θ is 90%,
averaging over ξ. For some ﬁxed true value of ξ, the 1D conﬁdence
interval generated might not have the desired 90% coverage, but
since the true value of ξ is, by assumption, not known, we are
content ifZ
dξ f ðξÞαθðξÞ ¼ 0:9 ð6Þ
where αθðξÞ is the coverage at true value θ for a particular true
value of ξ:
αθðξÞ ¼
Z
xAR
dx Pðxjθ; ξÞ: ð7Þ
Here R denotes the region in the measurement space X
determined by whatever ordering principle is used to construct
the conﬁdence intervals.
If αθðξÞ is a constant, not depending on ξ, then the coverage is
in fact independent of the nuisance parameter and the strong
deﬁnition of coverage is obtained.
Table 3
Derived 90% CL/CI lower bounds on the half-lives for 0νββ in units of 1025 years
from EXO data using various approaches. ‘Data Set 1’ is from the initial 2012
publication [13] and ‘Data Set 2’ is from the 2014 publication with quadruple the
exposure [14]. The ratios of bounds between data sets are also given. Notably less
restrictive frequentist bounds result from the larger data set owing to background
ﬂuctuations, whereas the Bayesian bound modestly improves.
Spectrum þ Wilks' F–C (71σ bin) Bayesian (71σ bin)
Data Set 1 41:6 42:2 41:1
Data Set 2 41:1 41:3 41:4
(integration: 41:2)
Set 1/Set 2 1.45 1.7 0.78 (0.92)
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Note that there is no essential difference between the case
where ξ is a true nuisance parameter versus the case that we wish
to incorporate the effect of one “physics” parameter in the pro-
jected conﬁdence region for another, such as generating a 1D con-
ﬁdence interval for the neutrino mixing parameter θ23 from a
likelihood function that depends on θ23 and Δm232.
6.1. The frequentist minimization procedure
The commonly recommended frequentist prescription for elim-
inating a nuisance parameter is the “proﬁle” method, in which the
proﬁled likelihood is generated by maximizing Lðxjθ; ξÞ over ξ for
each ﬁxed value of θ:
LðxjθÞ ¼max
ξ
Lðxjθ; ξÞ ð8Þ
This suggests that, for example, to generate a Feldman–Cousins
conﬁdence interval in the presence of a nuisance parameter, we
should form the following likelihood ratio:
ΛθðxÞ ¼
Lðxjθ; ξ^θðxÞÞ
Lðxjθ^ ; ξ^Þ
ð9Þ
Here in the numerator, ξ^θðxÞ is the value of ξ that maximizes the
likelihood for a ﬁxed value of θ. In the denominator, θ^ and ξ^ are
the values of these parameters that globally maximize the like-
lihood. In all cases Λr1.
For any value of θ, there is a critical value cθ for which θ will be
included in the conﬁdence interval if ΛθðxÞ4cθ . The value of cθ is
chosen by construction so that the frequency with which this
selection occurs is 90%.
Ideally, we would want the critical value cθ to be independent
of ξ. In that case, the strong coverage condition holds, and the
integrity of the proﬁled 1D frequentist interval is maintained.
6.2. A simple example
Suppose we perform a single measurement of a quantity
expected to follow a Gaussian distribution with mean θþξ and
an RMS of 1, and that the result of this measurement is x. In this
case, θ and ξ are degenerate. Let us therefore suppose that we
have further knowledge that ξ¼ A71, with ξ following a Gaussian
distribution with mean A and RMS 1. This could result from a
previous measurement of ξ, such as from a calibration run. The
(unnormalized) joint likelihood function is therefore:
Lðx θ; ξÞ ¼ exp 12 ðxðθþξÞÞ2
h i
exp 12 ðξAÞ2
h i ð10Þ
It is trivial to see that this is globally maximized for ξ^ ¼ A,
θ^ ¼ xA, at which point Lðxjθ^ ; ξ^Þ ¼ 1.
For any ﬁxed value of θ, the likelihood is maximized at
ξ^θðxÞ ¼
xθþA
2
ð11Þ
This is just the arithmetic average of the value ξ¼ xθ that
maximizes the ﬁrst factor in the likelihood, and the best ﬁt value
ξ¼ A from the second factor. If the two Gaussian terms in the
likelihood had different σ's, this would instead be a weighted
average.
Inserting this expression into Eq. (9) gives
ΛθðxÞ ¼ exp 
1
4
ðxAθÞ2
 
: ð12Þ
This is the ordering parameter. For any ﬁxed (θ, ξ), we can
predict the distribution of x and, hence, of ΛθðxÞ, and determine
the critical value cθ for ΛθðxÞ such thatR
dxLðxjθ; ξÞHðΛθðxÞcθÞR
dx Lðxjθ; ξÞ ¼ 0:9 ð13Þ
where H is the Heaviside step function to insure that we include θ
in the conﬁdence interval only if ΛθðxÞ4cθ .
Since the distribution of x depends on ξ but ΛθðxÞ does not, it is
clear that Eq. (13) cannot be guaranteed to hold for all ξ. Therefore,
the conﬁdence interval construction does not satisfy the strong
coverage condition—the procedure does not yield conﬁdence inter-
vals that give the correct coverage for all combinations of θ and ξ.
In this case, one might at least try to err on the side of caution by
choosing the smallest critical value that is obtained for any ξ, giving
the desired coverage level for that one value of ξ and giving over-
coverage for other values. (For example, Cranmer has proposed
including in the 1D interval any value of θ for which the standard
2D conﬁdence region is not empty for at least one value of ξ [17].)
However, this method not only is extremely likely to give over-
coverage for almost all true values of ξ, but also may give overly
large intervals dictated by the most extreme possible value of ξ.
The alternative is to give up on the strong coverage condition
and settle for “weak coverage”, as per Eq. (6). To achieve this, one
can simply interpret the likelihood function as a joint probability
distribution for x and ξ. Drawing values for x and ξ randomly from
this distribution (for ﬁxed θ), one can, for example, then calculate
the distribution for ΛθðxÞ by Monte Carlo and determine the
appropriate critical value to give the desired coverage. Correct
coverage of the “weak” kind is then obtained with the following
meaning: if the experiment were done a large number of times,
and if ξ had a different random value for each trial with a joint
probability distribution Lðξ; xjθÞ, then 90% of the generated inter-
vals would contain the true value of θ.
This is clearly a hybrid approach. In order to create a “frequen-
tist” interval with desired coverage for θ, we are integrating out
the nuisance parameter ξ. In doing this, we are forced to treat ξ in
a Bayesian way, with an assumed prior distribution, and must
partly abandon the frequentist paradigm. This is of course exactly
the approach of Cousins–Highland [18], and its performance and
that of proﬁling the likelihood have been explored by a number of
authors [19,20]. The contribution of this Bayesian aspect to the
overall conﬁdence interval is not necessarily small since, for exa-
mple, it is a common goal to run experiments to the point where
systematic uncertainties dominate.
Even if one still chose to accept a pseudo-Bayesian way of getting
rid of nuisance parameters in order to create pseudo-frequentist
intervals on the remaining parameters of interest, the incursion of
Bayesian philosophy cannot necessarily be so simply contained.
Consider the case of a neutrino oscillation experiment with no
systematic uncertainties, and sensitivity to two oscillation para-
meters Δm2, θ. While one can readily produce frequentist con-
ﬁdence regions in the 2D contour plane, what happens if we want
to quote a 1D limit on either of the parameters? This is mathema-
tically identical to eliminating a nuisance parameter, although, in
this case, the parameter is actually one of physical interest. Except in
special cases, it is not possible to produce 1D frequentist conﬁdence
intervals with correct coverage for all values of the other parameter.
The best that can be hoped for is to achieve “weak” coverage, but
this then implies marginalizing in a Bayesian way over the other
parameter (as, for example, in [21]). One is forced to be Bayesian
about any parameter that is being eliminated from the problem, or
else abandon the notion of deﬁning a consistent statistical coverage.
We suggest that, rather than seeking such work-arounds and
compromises to the frequentist treatment of nuisance parameters,
it is prudent to instead ask why such steps are necessary in the
ﬁrst place. If the mathematical framework is inconsistent, this
may suggest that the thinking leading up to the use of such an
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approach is also inconsistent and, therefore, likely to lead to fur-
ther difﬁculties and misinterpretations.
6.3. Bayesian treatment of nuisance parameters
Nuisance parameters present no special difﬁculties for a Bayesian
analysis. If LðDjθ; ξÞ is a likelihood function for a datum D depending
on a nuisance parameter ξ, any constraints on this parameter are
easily included as part of the prior in Bayes' Theorem. For example,
ξ might represent the rate of a background process, perhaps mea-
sured in a separate calibration or side channel. A probability
distribution gðξÞ can then be assigned for ξ which, together with
a prior f ðθÞ for the physics parameter θ, can be used as priors in
Bayes Theorem to give a joint posterior distribution for both θ and ξ:
Pðθ; ξjDÞpLðDjθ; ξÞf ðθÞgðξÞ ð14Þ
Dependence on the unwanted parameter ξ can then be removed
simply by integrating the posterior distribution with respect to ξ.
It is worth noting that because the likelihood function LðDjθ; ξÞ
depends on ξ, the measurement itself may often contain useful
information on the true value of ξ. Incorporating prior information
on ξ along with information derived from D through the likelihood
makes full use of all of the information about ξ that is available.
This is often a superior approach to Monte Carlo methods in which
random values of ξ are drawn from the distribution gðξÞ, and then
used to ﬁt for θ, with ξ held constant in each ﬁt. If the Monte Carlo
approach is used, the results of ﬁtting for θ using each random
throw of ξ should ideally be weighted by the calculated likelihood
for that value of ξ.
Choosing appropriate priors for nuisance parameters repre-
senting systematic uncertainties is also generally straightforward
in practice. If the constraint on the nuisance parameter is the
result of an independent measurement, the likelihood function for
that measurement can be an appropriate choice of prior for gðξÞ in
Eq. (14) (possibly further modiﬁed by any theoretical priors on ξ
itself). Physical boundaries, such as requiring background rates to
be non-negative, are easily incorporated by setting the prior to
zero in the unphysical region and, in fact, should always be incl-
uded to prevent unphysical behavior in the posterior distribution.
In the case that there is no previous measurement upon which to
base a prior for the nuisance parameter, the guidelines in Section
9.2 “Choice of Bayesian Priors” may be used.
Appendix B contains further discussion of the mathematical
relationship between integrating over a nuisance parameter vs.
maximizing the likelihood with respect to one.
7. Issues with uniﬁcation
The paper of Feldman and Cousins advocates the use of a
“uniﬁed approach,” in which the formalism of the interval con-
struction itself dictates whether upper bounds or two-sided con-
ﬁdence intervals are given. The argument for this is to avoid the
problem of “ﬂip-ﬂopping,” whereby different experimenters choose
for themselves when to quote a given type of interval based on the
result, leading to a small statistical bias in frequentist coverage in
some cases if one were to do an unﬁltered survey of only those
frequentist intervals reported. It should be emphasized again that
this is a purely frequentist issue — Bayesian intervals are immune to
such effects as they are not deﬁned with respect to ensembles.
The frequency with which signals are excluded can, for border-
line cases, be as much as 50% higher than would be inferred from
the nominal conﬁdence level (see Appendix C). In other words, an
ensemble of 90% CL bounds may only have 85% coverage. This
deviation from nominal coverage is of similar magnitude to the
inherent variations in frequentist coverage due to quantized Poisson
statistics (see Appendix A). In practice, it is also the case that any
such biases are often dwarfed by other factors, including difﬁculties
in assessing and propagating systematic uncertainties, accounting
for look-elsewhere effects, and various details of the particular
analysis approach employed. In addition, it should be considered
that results are generally not taken purely at face value, but are
often re-analyzed and combined with other results when appro-
priate and that the effect in question diminishes as signiﬁcance
levels move away from the cross-over region (where measurements
are generally viewed conservatively in any case, independent of
what type of interval may be quoted). Therefore, the potential
impact of “ﬂip-ﬂopping” is, in fact, not particularly signiﬁcant in
relative terms.
On the other hand, the adoption of a uniﬁed approach imposes
substantial constraints that can lead to non-trivial difﬁculties:
 The approach conﬂicts with the desired and scientiﬁcally well-
motivated convention to quote a 90% or 95% CL for upper/lower
bounds for results that are consistent with the zero signal
hypothesis, but to only claim a 2-sided discovery interval when
the zero signal hypothesis is rejected at a considerably higher
conﬁdence level (typically in excess of 3 or more standard
deviations). Indeed, even in cases where a uniﬁed 2-sided int-
erval may be shown, it is often accompanied by the phrase, “we
regard this as an upper limit” when the signiﬁcance is not
judged to have passed a critical level, despite the fact that the
coverage is not appropriate for such a limit.
 A uniﬁed approach cannot easily cope with look-elsewhere effects
(i.e. trials factors). For example, if a search for gamma-ray emission
from 1000 different astrophysical sources results in no event
excess exceeding 3 standard deviations above the background
levels, the data may be judged to be consistent with statistical
ﬂuctuations and the most appropriate things to quote are upper
bounds on the possible emission from each source. However, a
uniﬁed approach would instead necessitate a 3σ detection interval
for observations consistent with chance ﬂuctuations.
 Even in the case of a clear detection, it may still be relevant to
also quote upper and lower bounds in the context of certain
models. For example, some classes of models may simply place
bounds on the allowed maximum luminosity of a given source.
Thus, different interval constructions can be simultaneously
valid and relevant for the same results, as they simply address
different questions.
These difﬁculties appear to substantially outweigh any beneﬁt
of making what is, in the end, a minor correction to frequentist
coverage. Therefore, on balance, we believe it is pragmatically adv-
antageous to allow the nature of interval constructions to be
determined by the experimenters themselves based on an assess-
ment of scientiﬁc relevance, rather than having these dictated by
an inﬂexible and, ultimately, inappropriate formalism.
8. Convergence, divergence and confusion
The likelihood function is central to all the approaches described
and increasingly constrains the model parameters and dominates
the deﬁnition of these intervals with increasing numbers of events.
Hence, in the limit of large numbers of events, the dependence on
the particular choice of prior becomes insigniﬁcant in the Bayesian
construction, and the Feldman–Cousins ordering parameter has
little effect away from a physical boundary such as the origin. All
methods therefore converge on the same bounds in this region.
This helps to address the question of what constitutes a sufﬁcient
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ensemble of measurements in the frequentist approach for the
constructed intervals to begin to reliably constrain a model. Namely,
this occurs when there is a sufﬁcient sampling to well-characterize
the likelihood space of measurements, at which point such an app-
roach would produce the same answer as for the Bayesian method.
The deviation between approaches in the region of low
numbers of events is therefore largely a reﬂection of the fact that
there is not yet enough information to make a more deﬁnitive
statement about the model without supplying at least some add-
itional constraints. The frequentist approach in this case is to sim-
ply place the measurement in context for some hopeful ensemble
of other experiments without trying to identify the model, while
the Bayesian approach is typically to seek out some minimal set of
“reasonable and conservative” constraints in order to infer which
model parameter values are the most likely. These philosophies
are not mutually exclusive — both goals are valuable in the case of
limited information and simply need to be appropriately deﬁned
and distinguished.
However, in many cases, a lack of clarity in this regard and a
reticence to provide both types of information has led to confusion. An
informal survey of physics journal articles suggests that, in a large
fraction of cases, quoted frequentist intervals are often used to make
statements regarding constraints on model parameter values, either
by the authors themselves or by others in subsequent articles, even
when the natures of the intervals are explicitly stated. Parameter
exclusion plots, as the name implies, are instinctively interpreted as
deﬁning allowed and disallowed regions of model parameter space
based on the data. This is an inherently Bayesian interpretation, yet
the nature of the derived contours is not always consistent with this.
We believe that there is need of a more pragmatic approach which
recognizes that, while it is critical to objectively convey the informa-
tion content of the data, there is also a strong desire to derive bounds
on model parameter values and a natural instinct to interpret things
this way.
9. Towards a more relevant and transparent approach
9.1. Relevant statements for scientiﬁc papers
We start with an attempt to distill the basic statements that are
desirable to make regarding the nature of results from an experi-
mental measurement. There are typically four issues of relevance:
1. To present the measured value of a direct observable and an
assessment of systematic uncertainties that could bias the mea-
surement. This results in a simple, objective statement conce-
rning the observation.
2. To address the question, “How often would a measurement
‘like mine’ occur under the zero signal hypothesis?” This is a
frequency question probing statistical consistency and focusing
on an observable in the context of a single, ﬁxed model (i.e. a
Fisher-type test). For this, the normalized PDF for observations
under the zero signal hypothesis can be appropriately inte-
grated (including integration over any nuisance parameters) to
arrive at an assessment, i.e. a “p-value”. There is, however, some
ambiguity in what is meant by ‘like mine.’ For example, “How
likely is it to measure a rate this high?” or “How likely is it to
measure a rate this far away from the predicted value under the
zero signal hypothesis?” As there is not a general form for this,
it needs to be deﬁned in a relevant way on a case-by-case basis.
Note that this is not equivalent to deﬁning a frequentist interval
— the result is just a single number representing the statistical
chance of measuring a value for the observable in a ‘similar
range’ under the zero signal hypothesis. Inferences based on
p-values should be treated with caution (see, for example, [23]
for further discussion).
3. To address the question, “What constraints do my measure-
ments of direct observables place on model parameter values?”
This is explicitly a Bayesian question and, thus, requires the
application of the appropriate formalism, including the use of a
prior to deﬁne the relative context of models.
4. To objectively convey the relevant information content of the
data so as to allow the impact of alternative assumptions to be
evaluated, facilitate the testing of different models, and permit
information from this measurement to be effectively combined
with that from other experiments. Frequentist intervals are
blunt instruments for this purpose that only provide a crude
simpliﬁcation of likelihood information viewed through a
particular, non-unique ﬁlter that may be prone to misinterpre-
tation. In practice, such intervals are rarely used in the
ensemble tests for which they are relevant, being disfavored
relative to combined analyses that either use the raw data or
likelihood maps from different experiments. A better approach
would therefore be to actually provide, to the best extent
possible, the likelihood information directly.
The means by which to address the ﬁrst two of these issues is
relatively straightforward and largely uncontroversial. We will
therefore now concentrate on approaches relevant for the latter
two issues.
9.2. Choice of Bayesian priors
As indicated previously, in order to use measurements to
bound model parameter values, a context for these values must
be provided in the form of a prior probability. This conveniently
permits known, physical constraints to be imposed (e.g. energies
and masses must be greater than zero; the position of observed
events must be inside the detector, etc.) and allows known
attributes of the physical system to be taken into account (e.g.
energies are being sampled from a particular spectrum; the
relative probabilities for different event classes are drawn from a
given distribution, etc.). The choice of priors in such contexts is
often non-controversial. Less straightforward is the case of deﬁn-
ing a prior within the physical region when there is no a priori
knowledge of the probability distribution for a given model
parameter: the so-called “non-informative” prior. It may seem
odd to need to choose a prior at all under such circumstances, but
the fact is that “no knowledge” is a fuzzy concept whose meaning
needs to be deﬁned.
We should note (as others have) that it is rarely the case that
there is really “no prior information” at all, as we will generally
have some knowledge of previous observations related to the
current measurement. At the same time, it is best to avoid tuning
priors to previous observations in too substantive a way in order to
preserve the robustness of independent veriﬁcation. Typically
then, the term “non-informative” prior actually refers to a “weakly
informative” prior.
At ﬁrst glance, one might think that providing an equal
weighting to all parameter values (i.e. uniform in probability)
would make the most intuitive sense for the non-informative case.
However, this runs into two issues, one trivial and one non-trivial.
The trivial issue is that such a prior is improper, not having a ﬁnite
integral, and also begs the question of whether you actually
believe, for example, that it is equally likely to detect 1010 events
as it is to detect 3. However, in practice, the prior is always
multiplied by the likelihood function, which suppresses its impact
outside of the region of interest for the actual observation and
makes the exact form of the prior far from this region irrelevant.
Thus, a uniform prior should really be viewed as a sufﬁcient
S.D. Biller, S.M. Oser / Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research A 774 (2015) 103–119112
approximation to one that actually trails off to zero at some point
in a manner that does not need to be speciﬁcally deﬁned. The non-
trivial issue with uniform priors is that uniformity is not necessa-
rily preserved for parameters couched in a different form. Thus, for
example, a prior distribution that is uniform in the parameter S is
not uniform in S2. This therefore requires a choice to be made as to
what form of the model parameters might be reasonably assumed
to have a uniform prior probability distribution.
The subject of non-informative priors is one of active discus-
sion and debate. One common alternative is to use a Jeffreys prior
[24], which uses the Fisher information content of the likelihood
function itself to deﬁne a non-informative prior that is transfor-
mationally invariant. While this approach often works well for
simple situations, the application of this is not always straightfor-
ward for realistic analysis scenarios that may involve multiple,
multi-dimensional signal and background components, often with
non-parametric forms, nuisance parameters for error propagation,
and multi-parameter signal models. Consequently, this can also
lead to forms of the prior that are non-intuitive and depend on the
particular analysis in which it is applied.
It should be emphasized at this point that there is often no
“correct” choice of prior. Making any statement regarding the
viability of a given model based on the data necessarily requires a
stated frame of reference, and the prior just deﬁnes the context
within which one chooses to make this assessment. With this unde-
rstanding in mind, we take the pragmatic view that a non-infor-
mative prior should be intuitively reasonable, simple to apply and
visualize, and must allow for the impact of an alternative choice of
prior to be easily evaluated. To this end, we suggest that the use of
uniform priors would be preferred and that relevant model para-
meters should be couched in simple forms that make this a not
unreasonable choice. The nature of bounds on different forms can
then be derived from this initial determination. This approach has
the further advantage that maps of the Bayesian probability densities
couched in terms of such “ﬂat” parameters are identical to likelihood
maps, which can then serve the important dual purpose of providing
both a Bayesian assessment of model viability and a detailed
presentation of the objective information content of the data.
For the purpose of consistency, it would be advantageous to
establish common conventions (e.g. PDG guidelines) for such ﬂat
parameter forms relevant to different types of experimental
measurement. Fortunately, while the number of possible models
is inﬁnite, the basic nature of fundamental parameters on which
these models depend is not, and we believe that ﬁnding agree-
ment on a set of reasonable choices is not a particularly cont-
entious issue in practice. As a general rule of thumb, our per-
ception of model parameters often falls into one of two cate-
gories: either they are variables of magnitude, with values
spanning the same general order and for which a uniform prior
(sometimes over a limited range) may be a reasonable choice; or
they are variables of scale, potentially spanning several orders of
magnitude and for which it may be appropriate to weight such
scales equally, resulting in a prior that is uniform in the log. These
two choices typically bound the range of non-informative priors
that are generally considered to be plausible. It is, for example,
usually difﬁcult to justify a form of non-informative prior that
actually rises with signal strength or falls faster than would be
implied by giving equal weight to all scales. Examples of priors
uniform in magnitude might include the value of an unknown
phase angle, the value of a spectral index, or the precision
measurement of a quantity whose rough magnitude is constra-
ined. Examples of priors uniform in scale might include the
energy scale for new physics, the cross-section for some non-sta-
ndard interaction, or ﬁrst measurements of quantities whose
rough magnitude is not constrained. A good indication of the rel-
evant variable class can often be taken from how they are
typically represented on parameter plots (i.e. whether they have
linear or logarithmic scale axes).
However, for models that directly depend on a counting rate
measurement (especially in the region of low event numbers), and
where there is not a strong case for another form of prior, we make
the pragmatic proposal to always use a prior proportional to a
uniform average counting rate. This is because the sensitivity
range for an experiment to detect a signal not previously estab-
lished does not typically stretch over several orders of magnitude
and, in the event that an upper bound is appropriate, this prior
choice produces a conservative number for evaluating the viability
of model parameter values. In addition, as shown in Appendix A,
this choice also tends to yield a good degree of statistical coverage
for simple cases which, while not necessary for Bayesian bounds,
we regard as convenient.
9.3. Sensitivity to prior
From Eq. (1) it is clear that, for a given hypothesis, H, and data
set, D, the posterior probability is related to the prior as follows:
log ðPðH DÞÞ ¼ log ðPðD HÞÞþ log ðPðHÞÞþC

¼ ∑
n
i ¼ 1
log ðf ðxijHÞÞþ
1
n
log ðPðHÞÞ
 
þC ð15Þ
where f is the likelihood function evaluated for each of n
independent data values x and C is a constant. Hence, the impact
of the prior probability, P(H), becomes less signiﬁcant as the num-
ber of events increase. However, it is still the case that the choice
of prior can, in some instances, have a notable impact on the
perception of model viability. The effect becomes particularly rele-
vant where parameter ranges are unconstrained over orders of
magnitude and arguments hold for choosing a nominal prior that
is uniform in the log. Consequently, while the analysis of the pre-
vious section can provide a reasonable basis for default parameter
representations and priors, in such cases we believe that it is also
important to speciﬁcally indicate the extent of the prior sensitivity.
As a reasonable and pragmatic approach, we suggest doing so by
comparing the results from the choice of a prior that is uniform in
scale with that which is uniform in the magnitude of the relevant
parameter. The impact can be indicated by an additional contour
on parameter maps and, if signiﬁcant, can then be further high-
lighted in the data summary.
It is frequently the case that the appropriate choice between the
two suggested forms of prior is clear and that either conservative
upper bounds can be derived in the case that the data is consistent
with no signal, or that the strength of an observed signal will help to
dictate robust bounds. However, if the choice of prior is not obvious,
and if the conclusions strongly depend on the available choice, then
avoiding a Bayesian method does not alter this fact. Using purely
frequentist approaches will merely hide the ambiguity, potentially
leading to false conclusions regarding the robustness of implications
for model parameter values.
When taken together, we believe that the type of approach
outlined, involving: (1) a pragmatic choice of prior; (2) an explicit
presentation of the likelihood; and (3) a test of the prior sensitivity
where appropriate, can provide a robust approach for indicating
Bayesian model constraints as an important component of the
overall presentation of results. In addition to helping avoid conf-
usion in interpretation, this would also serve the valuable purpose
(often overlooked) of explicitly indicating the strength of informa-
tion in the data and when reliable inferences regarding model
parameter values might be made.
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9.4. Uniﬁed likelihood maps and data summaries
As mentioned in the previous section, the suggestion is to display
the Bayesian posterior probability distribution in terms of model
parameters with uniform priors, which then simultaneously shows
the global likelihood as well. This probability should be suitably
marginalized over the non-essential parameters. It is sufﬁcient to
give the ratio of the Bayesian probability (likelihood) at any one
point to the maximumvalue. In fact, it would seem sensible to couch
this as 2 log ðL=LmaxÞ, since this is often approximately equivalent
to differences in χ2 from the best ﬁt and, thus, carries some intuition.
This also readily allows for approximate frequentist intervals to be
inferred via Wilks' Theorem, as discussed in Appendix A. As is often
done for 1-parameter models, a simple graph of this quantity as a
function of the parameter can be shown; for a 2-parameter model, a
2D contour or color map can be given; and for higher order models,
appropriate sample 2D slices (preferably in the most slowly varying
parameters) can be shown.
Bayesian credible intervals can be superimposed on top of
these plots and are simply computed by integrating the Bayesian
probability distribution (in this case equivalent to the distribution
of L=Lmax) in the space of these ﬂat parameters to ﬁnd the fraction,
f, of their distribution above some value L4LC . The contour
deﬁned by that value of 2 log ðLC=LmaxÞ then corresponds to the
credibility level CI¼ f. This approach also gets around another
common problem of attempting to interpret the meaning of
maximum likelihood contours in terms of signiﬁcance levels by
either relying on Wilks' Theorem (which, while often providing
good estimates, cannot always be relied upon for precision in the
region of low numbers of events and/or near a physical boundary),
or undertaking a potentially burdensome (in some cases, perhaps
intractable) Monte Carlo calculation. By contrast, the Bayesian
calculation is always well-deﬁned and has no such issues.
For the purposes of abstracts, text, tables etc., a convenient
summary of results is desired. In the case of single parameter models,
the value of the parameter corresponding to the maximum like-
lihood (which is equal to the maximum of the posterior distribution)
can be quoted along with the associated Bayesian credible interval.
For the multi-parameter case, results may be summarized by quoting
the marginalized Bayesian intervals for each parameter. As a short-
hand for more detailed likelihood shape information, especially
where behavior tends to be non-Gaussian, we suggest that bounds
in terms of ﬂat parameters be quoted at 2 different credibility levels,
for example, 90% and 99%, or 68% (1σ) and 95% (2σ). And, as
previously discussed, for cases where the choice between the two
types of priors leads to a notably less conservative constraint, the
impact should be speciﬁcally indicated.
9.4.1. Example 1: neutrino mixing
As a ﬁrst example, consider the case of neutrino oscillation and
mixing. Regarding the choice of non-informative prior for Δm2, if
the scale has not been ﬁrmly established, the value could correspond
to a range of scales and is generally plotted logarithmically. Accord-
ingly, this suggests the choice of a prior that is uniform in the log of
this variable. If the scale has already been well established in the
ﬁeld, a prior uniform in Δm2 may be more appropriate (though the
impact of the choice is unlikely to be substantial in this case).
For the unknown mixing angles and phases, non-informative
priors that are uniform in circular range are suggested. One
complication here is that the form the mixing angle takes in, for
example, the 2-neutrino vacuum mixing expression is sin 2 2θ,
which means that a given observation lead to an ambiguously
deﬁned value of θ itself, which can be in any of 4 quadrants. Indeed,
there is no clear consensus in the ﬁeld as to the best form to use for
such experiments, with various choices including sin 2 2θ, sin 2 θ
and tan 2 θ, making comparisons between different results and
different phenomenology papers troublesome. While various trigo-
nometric forms may appear to describe different phenomena, the
fundamental parameter is the angle itself and it therefore seems
appropriate to try to couch things in terms of this variable. The issue
of redundant multi-quadrant values that may arise from measure-
ments in some cases can be readily taken into account by using
variables such as jθþnπj, which then allows a non-redundant range
in θ to represent other quadrants simultaneously.
As a more speciﬁc example of such a construction, we use the
publicly available contour map data from the 2005 SNO salt phase
solar neutrino mixing parameter analysis [25]. At the time of this
data, the scale of Δm212 had not yet been unambiguously estab-
lished by solar neutrino data, so we choose a prior that is uniform
in the log of this parameter. We therefore obtain the plot in Fig. 4.
The color scale represents the range of ln ðL=LmaxÞ, while solid
line contours are also shown corresponding to Bayesian credibility
levels of 68%, 95% and 99.73%. The values of 2 ln ðLC=LmaxÞ
corresponding to these levels were found to be 2.82, 6.58 and
12.76, respectively, which are not so far from the naive Wilks'
expectation for critical Δχ2 values corresponding to a 2D para-
meter space (2.3, 6.1, 11.8). This suggests that frequentist con-
straints would look very similar in this case. To indicate the
sensitivity to the choice of prior, the dashed line contour indicates
the 68% CI region if a prior that was uniform in Δm212 itself were
used. This region is of a very similar size to the LMA 68% contour
using the default prior that is uniform in scale, with a relatively
modest displacement of boundary positions. This indicates that
this range is relatively insensitive to the form of the prior and
conclusions regarding the model here are reasonably robust. How-
ever, the LOW region would be eliminated, suggesting that the
default choice of a prior uniform in log ðΔm212Þ is the more cons-
ervative approach in this case.
For the data summary, we obtain the marginalized uniform
Bayesian intervals jθþnð1801Þj ¼ 33:8þ2:3ð4:6Þ1:7ð4:4Þ degrees at the 68%
(95%)CI. For Δm212, we have the interesting situation that the SNO
data alone cannot separate LOW and LMA solutions at the desired
credibility levels with the assumed prior, giving rise to a bi-modal
distribution in the marginalized parameter. In this case, both
possibilities should be presented using the 2-part intervals that
Fig. 4. Conﬁdence intervals derived from the SNO experiment's salt phase data
[25]. The colors represent the difference in the log of the likelihood ratio or,
equivalently, differences in the posterior probability calculated with uniform priors
for both axes, relative to the maximum point. The solid black lines are 68%, 95%,
and 99.73% Bayesian contours found by integrating the posterior distribution. The
black dashed region is the 68% credible region found under an alternative prior that
is uniform in Δm2 rather than log ðΔm2Þ. (For interpretation of the references to
color in this ﬁgure caption, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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are naturally produced by selecting the highest probability den-
sities that constitute 68% and 95% of the overall distribution,
respectively. Thus, we obtain the marginalized uniform Bayesian
intervals  log 10ðΔm212Þ ¼ 4:3þ0:1ð0:25Þ0:3ð0:45Þ eV2 and 6:88þ0:03ð0:17Þ0:03ð0:23Þ eV2
at the 68%(95%)CI.
9.4.2. Example 2: rare event search
Unfortunately, it is not a common enough practice for experi-
ments to provide detailed likelihood information. Consequently, to
provide an example of an analysis operating in a much more
restricted range of event numbers, we will consider a hypothetical
experiment generically searching for rare events. For simplicity,
we will assume this to be a counting experiment with negligible
systematic uncertainties and a well-deﬁned background expecta-
tion, along the lines of the examples considered earlier in this doc-
ument.
Assume that the expected background is B¼5 events in the
region of interest and that 10 events are observed. We thenwish to
place 90% CI upper bounds on the average signal strength, S. In
accordance with previous discussion, as this measurement relates
to a low-rate counting experiment, we choose a prior that is uni-
form in S. We would therefore use the Poisson likelihood function
from Eq. (2) with B¼5 to plot 2lnðL=LmaxÞ as a function of S, as
shown in Fig. 5.
Even for such a simple measurement, the likelihood function
will typically not, in fact, be a simple Poisson distribution owing to
an imperfect knowledge of the expected background and systema-
tic uncertainties, the effects of which must be taken into account
by an appropriate marginalization of the distribution.
The Bayesian uniform prior upper bounds are indicated on the
plot for 90%, 95% and 99% CI. As the alternative choice of a prior
uniform in log ðSÞ would result in a smaller value for the bound
(e.g. So7:35 at 90% CI), it is not necessary to show the impact of
this alternate choice since the chosen prior represents the con-
servative value. Thus, we may simply quote the Bayesian uniform
prior upper bounds on S as 10.4(15.2) at the 90%(99%) CI.
The dashed line also shown on the plot corresponds to an
approximate frequentist 90% CL based on Wilks' theorem and
suggests that an interval would be called for under a uniﬁed appr-
oach spanning 0.66-11.1 (comparable to the corresponding Feldman–
Cousins interval of 1.2–11.5). Hence, for this case, frequentist num-
bers are reasonably similar to those from the Bayesian approach,
with the slight difference at the upper end largely due to the choice
to quote a 1-sided versus a 2-sided bound.
If we instead considered the scenario described earlier where
B¼9 and 5 events are observed, the likelihood plot shown in Fig. 6
is instead produced.
In this case, as previously described, the Bayesian upper bound
is 3.88, while the frequentist bound inferred from Wilks' theorem
is only 2.64 (slightly more conservative than the Feldman–Cousins
bound of 2.38 for this scenario). This is an example where freq-
uentist bounds are misleadingly foreshortened as a result of neg-
ative ﬂuctuations and prone to misinterpretation.
10. Conclusion
The distillation of constraints on theoretical model parameter
values is central to scientiﬁc enquiry and represents the ultimate goal
of experimental observations. There is therefore an understandable
desire to interpret the probable nature of such constraints as well as
to deﬁne the objective details of experimental observations, even
when the available information content of the data is necessar-
ily limited. A failure to recognize both aspects and clearly represent
them with distinct and appropriate formalisms inevitably leads to
misinterpretation and misuse of quoted conﬁdence intervals.
Frequentist conﬁdence intervals, even “sophisticated” imple-
mentations such as Feldman-Cousins, generally suffer from sig-
niﬁcant shortcomings in this regard:
 They do not reliably indicate the relevance of individual meas-
urements.
 They are prone to frequent misinterpretation that can result in
incorrect conclusions and seemingly paradoxical behaviors.
 They do not provide a robust basis for the comparison of diff-
erent experimental results.
 There is no self-consistent approach to propagate systematic
uncertainties.
 There is no self-consistent method for producing a lower-
dimensional conﬁdence interval with a desired statistical cov-
erage from a higher-dimensional interval.
 They do not possess a unique deﬁnition and represent a very
limited view of the underlying likelihood information.
Furthermore, frequentist intervals are rarely, if ever, actually used
for the purpose in which their context is meaningfully deﬁned:
constraining model parameter values at the designated conﬁdence
Fig. 5. Difference in log likelihood from the best-ﬁt signal strength, as a function of
signal strength, for a Poisson process with background rate B¼5 where 10 events
are observed. The vertical lines represent Bayesian upper limits at the stated
conﬁdence levels, while the intersections of the dashed horizontal line with the
curve indicates the 90% CL two-sided limits from Wilks' Theorem.
Fig. 6. Difference in log likelihood between the best-ﬁt signal strength, as a
function of signal strength, for a Poisson process with background rate B¼9 where
5 events are observed. The vertical lines represent Bayesian upper limits at the
stated credibility levels, while the intersections of the dashed horizontal line with
the curve indicate the two-sided 90% CL limits from Wilks' Theorem.
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level with a large ensemble of similar measurements. Even where
multiple measurements exist, the practice is generally to under-
take a combined analysis with either the raw measurements or
likelihood maps from individual experiments rather than to com-
pare frequentist intervals. As such, the relevance of quoting int-
ervals that are never actually used for their intended purpose (and,
in fact, are readily abandoned with the addition of further data) is
questionable. As far as objectively conveying the information
content of the data, we therefore believe that providing the like-
lihood itself as a function of relevant model parameters offers the
clearest and most useful approach.
Bayesian credible intervals offer the only well-deﬁned mathe-
matical approach to placing bounds on model parameter values
themselves and, thus, are a necessary component of data prese-
ntation if one is to address this aspect. Bayesian intervals are gen-
erally free from many of the problems that plague frequentist
intervals, but suffer from the one issue of requiring the speciﬁca-
tion of a prior to establish the context of the model. However, we
argue here that
1. For Poisson statistics in particular, the use of a prior that is
uniform in the counting rate produces conservative upper
bounds and offers a pragmatically defensible choice for bound-
ing model parameter values. (Appendix A shows that these
credible intervals also have reasonable frequentist coverage for
simple cases.)
2. In other areas, the forms for priors are effectively bounded
between those that are uniform in magnitude and those that
are uniform in scale (i.e. equal weighting in the log), where the
appropriate choice between these two alternatives for a given
parameter class is usually obvious.
3. When appropriate, explicit indications of the sensitivity to
this choice of prior can easily be shown, which provides
additional valuable details regarding the strength of informa-
tion contained in the data that is otherwise hidden (rather
than avoided) by pure frequentist methods.
Taken together, we believe that this provides a clear and robust
approach to the presentation of model constraints. Achieving a
community consensus on such an approach for Bayesian intervals
seems both straightforward and of more practical beneﬁt than con-
tinuing to only use frequentist constructions which are, themselves,
arbitrary and prone to the numerous difﬁculties previously listed.
We also recommend that the global likelihood for data sets be
shown as a function of ‘ﬂat’ Bayesian model parameters to sim-
ultaneously indicate the Bayesian posterior probability distribu-
tion and objectively represent the relevant information content of
the data. Such representations allow other analysts to more
optimally combine information from other experiments and test
models under different assumptions. Bayesian credibility levels
can be readily indicated on such plots and approximate frequentist
intervals can also generally be extracted if desired by appealing
to Wilks' Theorem (which is found to work well for Poisson
statistics even for small numbers of events).
As previously indicated, we believe that the standardization of
priors is straightforward and no more arbitrary than choosing any
other type of interval construction. For data summaries, we ther-
efore recommend quoting Bayesian credibility bounds in terms of
common ﬂat parameter forms, marginalizing where appropriate
for multi-dimensional parameter spaces. As a shorthand for more
detailed likelihood/Bayesian shape information, we also suggest
that, where convenient, such bounds are quoted at two different
credibility levels, such as 90% and 99%, or 68% and 95%.
Overall, we believe that this to represent a much more well-
balanced approach to the presentation of experimental results
that offers a higher degree of relevance and transparency than
purely frequentist conventions, while still providing objective
information about the measurement in a more useful form.
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Appendix A. Coverage and consistency
A.1. Frequentist coverage
Central to the frequentist paradigm is the concept of statistical
coverage: that limits derived from an ensemble of repeated
experiments would correctly bound the true model a known
fraction of the time. This is a hypothetical construction, indepen-
dent of the prospect for actually achieving a large enough ens-
emble of measurements to reliably bound a model with the
relevant accuracy this way. Indeed, as there is no clear criteria
for when an ensemble is large enough for frequentist intervals to
ever be used to constrain model parameter values, nor how this
could even be done in principle outside of ultimately employing
Bayesian statistics, the construction is hypothetical even where
there is a large ensemble of measurements.
In this context, the necessity to produce precise frequentist
bounds can seem a little unclear. In fact, as discussed in Section 6,
achieving exact coverage is often not actually possible in the
presence of systematic uncertainties, and is not possible for cou-
nting statistics even without such uncertainties, since the quan-
tized nature of measurements inevitably leads to coverages that
are either a little greater than the target conﬁdence level (over-
coverage) or less than this target (under-coverage). The former of
these is generally chosen to insure coverage in excess of the target
conﬁdence level (though one might pragmatically argue that such
intervals need only be determined to an accuracy comparable to
that with which they will ever actually be used to bound a model).
Consequently, it is possible to spend large amounts of CPU time
computing Feldman–Cousins intervals in which the achieved
precision does not reﬂect the achieved accuracy.
The coverage map for the Neyman construction of 90% CL
intervals using the Feldman–Cousins ordering rule is shown in
Fig. A.1 for Poisson statistics in the region of low counts. This ﬁgure
plots the frequency with which the true model parameter value
lies outside of the derived bounds and indicates the extent and
distribution of the inherent over-coverage. This assumes a perfect
knowledge of the background level, no systematic uncertainties,
etc. Here the over-coverage, which can be as large as a few percent
for certain values of the signal and background rates, is due ent-
irely to the discrete nature of Poisson counting statistics.
While the Neyman construction permits the most controlled
deﬁnition of frequentist intervals, it is also often usefully the case
that approximate frequentist intervals can be much more easily
derived from the global likelihood itself by appealing to Wilks'
Theorem, which says that, in the large n limit, 2 log LR is
distributed as a χd2 distribution, where LR is the likelihood ratio
between nested hypotheses deﬁned by d model parameters. In
fact, this works surprisingly well for Poisson statistics, even for
small numbers of counts (as might be implied by the fact that the
Bartlett correction for this case is estimated to be small [16]). The
corresponding coverage map for this is shown in Fig. A.2, where a
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χ2 threshold of 2.706 is used for 2 log ðL=LbestÞ to deﬁne a 2-sided
90% CL interval similar to Feldman–Cousins, with Lbest evaluated
for non-negative values of S (which leads to the over-coverage
seen on the left side of the plot). A very good approximation to 90%
coverage is achieved and, in fact, for most of the plane, the
magnitude of the deviation from exact coverage is no larger than
that seen in the Feldman–Cousins case of Fig. A.1. If desired, the
areas of slight under-coverage can be all but eliminated to achieve
more conservative bounds by simply choosing slightly higher
threshold values for the likelihood ratio.
Conveniently, the accuracy with which Wilks' theorem approx-
imates the coverage suggests that reasonable estimates of fre-
quentist intervals can often be given, even for small statistics, by
simply providing the global likelihood as a function of relevant
model parameters without resorting to the computationally int-
ensive Feldman–Cousins construction. In cases where the applic-
ability of Wilks' theorem may be more questionable, Monte Carlo
simulations can be used to spot-check the implied coverage in the
region of interest.
A.2. Bayesian consistency
Bayesian credibility levels represent the degree of belief that
the limits derived from a particular observation actually bound the
true value of the model parameter. Unlike frequentist intervals, the
extent of Bayesian intervals are intended to directly represent the
probable range of the model parameter. To make this concept
tangible in the sense of calculation, we deﬁne “Bayesian consis-
tency” as the notion that, if possible model parameter values were
sampled according to the assumed prior distribution and instances
were selected where an experimental measurement would result
in exactly what was observed, then the derived credible intervals
correctly bound the true model in the desired fraction of these
cases. And, indeed, correctly constructed Bayesian intervals are
always exact in this sense for the assumed paradigm, even for the
case of Poisson statistics. As such, unlike frequentist coverage,
maps of Bayesian consistency are not necessary. It is also perhaps
worth noting that, since Bayesian credible intervals are speciﬁc to
each particular measurement and have a meaning that is inde-
pendent of any ensemble, the choice of interval type (e.g.“ﬂip-
ﬂopping,” as discussed in Section 7) has no impact at all on
Bayesian consistency.
A.3. Some unfair comparisons
While never intended for this purpose, it is nevertheless of
interest to explore the extent to which Bayesian constructions also
provide statistical coverage. In particular, we will explore the case
in which a uniform prior in signal rate is used for a simple, 1-D
Poisson observable. Results are shown in Fig. A.3 for Bayesian
upper bounds. As can be seen, these bounds tend to over-cover. In
other words, for an ensemble of repeated experiments, upper
bounds constructed using this Bayesian prescription will tend to
contain the true model value with a higher frequency than, for
example, Feldman–Cousins bounds. Therefore, at least for upper
bounds on counting statistics (which is also relevant to estimates
of experimental sensitivities), this prescription is conservative and
sufﬁcient for both deﬁnitions of coverage.
For 2-sided interval constructions, the coverage is modiﬁed, as
shown in Fig. A.4. Reasonable statistical coverage is generally ach-
ieved in this case as well, although there is some under-coverage in
the region corresponding to borderline signal detections. For such
cases, the 90% CI Bayesian bounds provide statistical coverage at the
level of 86% or more if treated as a frequentist CL.
Correspondingly, it is also of interest to explore the extent to
which frequentist constructions also provide Bayesian consistency
for this same case. Fig. A.5 shows this for the Feldman–Cousins
method and indicates the probability for the true model param-
eter value to lie outside of the derived bounds for a given
measurement, assuming that all signal strengths are equally likely.
Fig. A.2. Fraction of time with which 90% conﬁdence intervals generated by Wilks'
theorem for a Poisson observation do not contain the true signal rate, as a function
of the true signal rate and the background rate (which is assumed to be known
perfectly). The magnitude of deviations from the expected coverage is comparable
to the Feldman–Cousins case.
Fig. A.3. Fraction of time with which 90% CI Bayesian upper bounds generated with
Bayes theorem and a uniform prior for a Poisson observation, and then treated as a
CL, do not contain the true signal rate, as a function of the true signal rate and the
background rate. There is over-coverage, which implies that the Bayesian intervals
are more conservative than Neyman-constructed intervals for this choice of prior.
Fig. A.1. Fraction of time with which a Feldman–Cousins 90% conﬁdence interval
generated from Poisson observations does not contain the true signal rate, as a
function of the true signal rate and the background rate (which is assumed to be
known perfectly). The over-coverage of a few percent is intrinsic to the discrete
nature of the observable.
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This plot has a very different interpretation from Figs. A.1 to A.4: it
indicates what fraction of true values of the signal rate are not
contained in the Feldman–Cousins interval for a particular observed
number of counts, where each model value is given equal weight in
its assigned prior probability. Here, the frequentist CL value,
treated as a CI, can signiﬁcantly overestimate the credibility for
downward ﬂuctuations in the observed rate. The entire upper left
portion of the plot represents cases where the Feldman–Cousins
intervals very often do not contain the true signal rate. This again
highlights the fact that frequentist intervals only yield correct
statistical coverage as an ensemble average. However, for parti-
cular observations, the constructed interval can often be quite
unlikely to contain the true value of the parameter. While some
sections of the upper left region of this plot represent unlikely
ﬂuctuations, there is a reasonable fraction of phase space where
this is not the case. In fact, as the average signal strength
approaches zero, the frequency with which overestimation of
credibility levels occurs approaches 50%, with signiﬁcant over-
estimation occurring in more than 10% of cases. This gives rise to
many of the apparent paradoxes previously described when fre-
quentist intervals are misinterpreted as providing betting odds for
parameter values. Hence, while the Bayesian construction desc-
ribed here also typically provides reasonable frequentist coverage,
frequentist bounds do not generally provide good estimates of
Bayesian credibility.
It may be objected that these conclusions are based on a
particular choice of prior and that details will change for other
choices. Nevertheless, it is true to say that frequentist intervals will
generally not provide adequate Bayesian credibility estimates for
other common prior choices either. At the same time, while the
situation becomes more complicated with multiple dimensions,
this example demonstrates that it is possible to make a pragmatic
choice of a commonly used prior for Bayesian intervals that will
also provide a reasonable level of frequentist coverage for the case
of a simple Poisson observable. While such coverage is in no way
required for Bayesian intervals, we regard this property for the
simple Poisson case as convenient.
Appendix B. Maximization versus integration over nuisance
parameters
A point that is sometimes a source of confusion is that the
Bayesian and frequentist approaches for incorporating the effect of
nuisance parameters are often different. Given a joint likelihood
distribution Lðθ; ξÞ, a 1D Bayesian probability distribution for θ,
assuming a uniform prior πðξÞ for ξ, is given by
PðθÞp
Z
dξLðθ; ξÞπðξÞp
Z
dξLðθ; ξÞ  LmargðθÞ ðB:1Þ
where we may refer to LmargðθÞ as the “marginalized likelihood”
obtained from integrating Lðθ; ξÞ with a ﬂat prior for ξ. (Strictly
speaking LmargðθÞ is not a likelihood function but a posterior dist-
ribution, but since it plays an analogous role in Bayesian analyses
to the frequentist proﬁled likelihood the notation Lmarg is useful.)
In contrast, the frequentist approach to eliminating a nuisance par-
ameter is often to instead “proﬁle” the likelihood:
Lprof ðθÞ ¼max
ξ
Lðθ; ξÞ ðB:2Þ
It is not necessarily intuitive how these seemingly different met-
hods are related, if at all.
In fact, the marginalization by integration given in Eq. (B.1) is
the more fundamental method, and follows directly from the laws
of conditional probability. It is not often appreciated that the
“proﬁling” method is actually just a numerical approximation to
the full integration. This approximation, proposed by Laplace [22],
can be derived by rewriting Eq. (B.1):
LmargðθÞ ¼
Z
dξLðθ; ξÞ ¼
Z
dξ expð ln Lðθ; ξÞÞ: ðB:3Þ
For ﬁxed θ, one then proceeds by ﬁnding the maximum of ln L as a
function of ξ and doing a Taylor expansion around the value ξ^θ
that maximizes ln Lðθ;ξÞ:
LmargðθÞ 
Z
dξ exp ln Lðθ; ξ^θÞ
1
2
d2ðln Lðθ; ξÞÞ
dξ2


ξ^θ
ðξ ξ^θÞ2
0
@
1
A
ðB:4Þ
To the extent that higher order terms can be neglected, this
integral evaluates to
LmargðθÞp
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
d2ðln Lðθ; ξÞ
dξ2


ξ^θ
vuuuut
exp ln Lðθ; ξ^θÞ
 
ðB:5Þ
This is nothing other than Lprof times a correction factor which
depends on the second derivative of the likelihood function. If the
likelihood function is Gaussian, the correction factor is a constant
and so the approximation is exact, and if the likelihood function is
only approximately Gaussian, then its second derivative still only
Fig. A.4. Fraction of time with which two-sided 90% Bayesian credible intervals
generated with Bayes theorem and a uniform prior for a Poisson observation do not
contain the true signal rate, as a function of the true signal rate and the background
rate. There is mild over-coverage or under-coverage, with deviations from the exact
coverage of approximately the same size as those seen for Feldman–Cousins
intervals.
Fig. A.5. Probability that a 90% CL Feldman–Cousins interval excludes the true
mean signal rate given a particular observed number of counts and expected
background rate, where the probability is an average over equally weighted values
of the mean signal rate.
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varies slowly with θ. Expressed more simply in terms of the log
likelihood, we have
 ln LmargðθÞ   ln Lprof ðθÞþ
1
2
ln
d2ðln Lðθ; ξÞ
dξ2


ξ^θ
0
@
1
A ðB:6Þ
Hence, we see that the frequentist's method of eliminating
nuisance parameters by maximizing the likelihood as a function
of the unwanted parameter is actually just an approximation to
integrating over the parameter in the case that the joint likelihood
is Gaussian. Furthermore, Eq. (B.6) gives us a correction factor to
this approximation that can improve the accuracy in the case that
the likelihood is not exactly Gaussian.
To the extent that the likelihood function is well-approximated
by a multi-dimensional Gaussian, even a Bayesian analysis may
ﬁnd the multi-dimensional generalization of Eq. (B.6) a useful
numerical expedient to replace a potentially complicated integral
with a function minimization and the evaluation of the second
derivatives of ln L at that minimum.
Appendix C. Maximum size of frequentist “Flop-Flop” effect
The “ﬂip-ﬂop” effect is a phenomenon that only impacts fre-
quentist intervals and can occur when different experimenters
choose for themselves when to quote a given type of interval
based on the result, leading to a small statistical bias in frequentist
coverage. To estimate the maximum size of the effect, consider a
signal with a strength corresponding to an average detected
signiﬁcance level that is just at the threshold for an experimenter
to rule out the zero signal hypothesis. Accordingly, about half the
time, a ﬂuctuation will take place in the positive direction that will
result in a claimed detection and a 2-sided CL interval. In this case,
since the observed rate is larger than the true average signal rate, a
large enough upwards ﬂuctuation can result in an interval with a
lower limit larger than the average rate, which would then inc-
orrectly exclude this value. For a symmetric conﬁdence interval,
the frequency with which such values are nominally excluded in
the lower half of the distribution is 12 ð1CLÞ=0:5¼ 1CL (normal-
izing for only the lower half). However, when a negative ﬂuctua-
tion occurs, the signiﬁcance drops below threshold and a 1-sided
upper limit is set. The average signal is now larger than implied by
the observed number of events, and risks being excluded at the
upper end. The frequency with which signals are nominally exc-
luded in the upper half of such a 1-sided distribution is ð1CLÞ=
0:5¼ 2ð1CLÞ. Therefore, the total exclusion frequency for positive
and negative ﬂuctuations is 12 ð1CLÞþ12 ½2ð1CLÞ ¼ 32 ð1CLÞ.
Thus, the maximum effect would mean that a 90% CL only has
85% coverage, and a 99% CL only has 98.5% coverage.
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